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Many people enjoy eating meat but dislike causing pain to animals. Dissociating meat from its animal
origins may be a powerful way to avoid cognitive dissonance resulting from this ‘meat paradox’. Here, we
provide the ﬁrst comprehensive test of this hypothesis, highlighting underlying psychological mecha-
nisms. Processed meat made participants less empathetic towards the slaughtered animal than unpro-
cessed meat (Study 1). When beheaded, a whole roasted pork evoked less empathy (Study 2a) and
disgust (Study 2b) than when the head was present. These affective responses, in turn, made participants
more willing to eat the roast and less willing to consider an alternative vegetarian dish. Conversely,
presenting a living animal in a meat advertisement increased empathy and reduced willingness to eat
meat (Study 3). Next, describing industrial meat production as “harvesting” versus “killing” or
“slaughtering” indirectly reduced empathy (Study 4). Last, replacing “beef/pork” with “cow/pig” in a
restaurant menu increased empathy and disgust, which both equally reduced willingness to eat meat and
increased willingness to choose an alternative vegetarian dish (Study 5). In all experiments, effects were
strongly mediated by dissociation and interacted with participants’ general dissociation tendencies in
Study 3 and 5, so that effects were particularly pronounced among participants who generally spend
efforts disassociating meat from animals in their daily lives. Together, this line of research demonstrates
the large role various culturally-entrenched processes of dissociation play for meat consumption.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Meat consumption is at an all-time high in the western hemi-
sphere (OECD., 2014) and remains an inherent part of most people’s
diet (Ruby, 2012). Yet, many consumers experience what has been
referred to as a “meat paradox” (Loughnan, Haslam, & Bastian,
2010): They enjoy eating meat, but dislike causing pain to ani-
mals. To reduce this cognitive dissonance, omnivores may choose
different strategies. For instance, they may adjust their behavior
(e.g., by eating less meat), reduce their moral concern for animals
(Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012; Loughnan et al., 2010),
or ﬁnd hedonistic, nutritional and evolutionary justiﬁcations to
consume meat (Bohm, Lindblom, Åbacka, Bengs, & H€ornell, 2015;
Kubberød, Ueland, Tronstad, & Risvik, 2002; Piazza et al., 2015;
Rothgerber, 2013). A particularly effective way to solve this317 Oslo, Norway.
nst).cognitive dissonance may, however, be even simpler: Consumers
may simply dissociate meat from animals, that is, they may ignore
or suppress the fact that the meat they eat originates from once-
living creatures (van Rijswijk, Frewer, Menozzi, & Faioli, 2008).
Philosophers and animal rights activists have for long time
emphasized the potency of disconnecting meat from animals as a
strategy to deal with the meat paradox (e.g., Adams, 2004; Foer,
2010; Joy, 2011; Singer, 1995) and have taken for granted that it
has profound effects on meat consumption. For instance, Hopkins
and Dacey (2008) stated the following:
Modern American society loves to watch television cooking
showsdthe creativity, the sensuousness, the clever techniques.
But chances are, if a lamb were dragged in and killed at the
beginning of the program, most of the viewers would ﬁnd
themselves less interested in the lamb chop recipes. They would
be too horriﬁed or disgusted to enjoy the rest of the program.
And yet, if the lamb’s ﬂesh is brought in already killed and sliced,
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nearly unfelt. (pp. 579e580)
Similarly, various public ﬁgures have argued that dissociation
inﬂuences people’s meat consumption. For instance, when Face-
book founder Mark Zuckerberg decided to eat only meat he had
slaughtered himself for one year, he publicly reasoned that “many
people forget that a living being has to die for you to eat meat”
(Zellers, 2011). Celebrity vegetarian Paul McCartney even more
dramatically stated that “if slaughterhouses had glass walls,
everyone would be a vegetarian” (PETA, 2013).
There is also empirical evidence suggesting that many con-
sumers dislike when meat is not dissociated from its animal origin,
and that they refrain from thinking about living animals when they
buy or eat meat (Hoogland, de Boer, & Boersema, 2005; Kubberød
et al., 2002). Both vegetarians and non-vegetarians single out
characteristics of meat revealing the animal’s actual appearance
such as raw meat, blood and other body parts as distressing
(Beardsworth & Keil, 1992; Hoogland et al., 2005; Kenyon & Barker,
1998; Kubberød et al., 2002). Red meat is reported as being espe-
cially disgusting bywomen in particular (Beardsworth& Keil, 1992;
Kenyon & Barker, 1998; Kubberød et al., 2002; Santos & Booth,
1996), and when people move into vegetarianism they typically
begin with avoiding red meat (Beardsworth& Keil, 1992; Kenyon&
Barker, 1998; Santos & Booth, 1996). Moreover, types of ﬂesh that
are “de-animalized”, such as hamburgers, are often popular meat
products (Kubberød et al., 2002).
Although dissociation is shown to be common in the Western
world, and its effect on meat consumption is taken for granted in
scholarly and public discourse, a comprehensive empirical test of
the factual effects of dissociation is missing at present. In this paper,
we therefore aim to empirically demonstrate how the ways we
present, talk about and prepare meat in contemporary modern
societies make dissociation a powerful, culturally-entrenched
strategy for people to avoid the dissonance that results from the
meat paradox. The effects of dissociation on meat eating we expect
to be substantially mediated by empathy and disgust.1. Dissociation through processing, omission and
euphemisms
Earlier generations of humans were often familiar with indi-
vidual characteristics of the animals they ate as well as the way
animals were treated (Foer, 2010). Yet, as the traditional family farm
has been vastly replaced by large-scale corporate farming in many,
if not most, parts of the world (Magdoff, Foster, & Buttel, 2000), the
majority of omnivores have steadily less contact with the living
animals they consume (Leroy & Degreef, 2015). Animals were in
fact among the earliest part of themodern diet to be distanced from
consumers. Owing to power saws, acute division of labor, and more
efﬁcient transport and preservation, most consumers no longer
witness food animals’ lives and deaths (Belasco, 2008).
In addition to being uninvolved in the process of killing animals
per se, consumers seldom take part in later processing steps that
remove typical animal characteristics from the dead corpus (Lerner
& Kalof, 1999). These steps include beheading, the removal of
entrails, plucking, and cutting of animal bodies into consumer-
friendly pieces and portions as we see them in the supermarket.
As a consequence, popular meat products such as ‘minced’ or
‘ground’ meat hardly resemble the original animal host (Leroy &
Degreef, 2015). For the average consumer that did not take part
in these steps, buying meat at a late stage of processing should
therefore facilitate the process of dissociation (Kubberød et al.,
2002).Second, both the treatment of animals and the system that
transforms animals into meat are rendered invisible by the visual
representation of meat products (Rogers, 2008). For instance, while
cows are often displayed in dairy advertisement, they are less
common in advertisement of beef products (Grauerholz, 2007;
Heinz & Lee, 1998). Regardless of whether this presentation strat-
egy is consciously or unconsciously adopted by the meat industry,
the fact that knowing about food products’ origin can predict their
rejection (Rozin& Fallon, 1980) makes it likely that omitting cues of
animal origins from advertisements facilitates the process of
dissociation.
Third, dissociation can also be observed at the linguistic level.
Living animals are called cows, pigs, and calves, but once dead and
prepared for food they become beef, pork and veal (Adams, 2004;
Dunayer, 2001; Singer, 1995), with the consequence that a direct
reference to the animal origins of meat is linguistically blurred
(Heinz & Lee, 1998). In a similar manner, the way the food industry
talks about their large-scale killing of animals may sustain the
process of dissociation. “Meat plants” and “meat factories” are often
used as euphemisms for “butchery” and “slaughterhouse”, and
draw the attention away from the animals that are killed (Serpell,
1986). Likewise, the use of terms such as “harvesting” to refer to
the killing of animals may dissociate meat from the animal origin
by equating it with plants (Stibbe, 2001).
2. Dissociation and meat consumption: the mediating role of
empathy and disgust
Although experimental evidence is lacking, there is some
correlational support for the notion that dissociation predicts less
willingness to eat meat. Rothgerber (2013) showed that trait
dissociation, that is, a general tendency to avoid associating meat
with animals, was related to lower meat consumption and that this
tendency may be higher among people who generally refrain from
eating meat (Rothgerber, 2015). While there is little evidence
linking dissociation to meat eating, no study has to our knowledge
investigated the underlying affective processes of dissociation. We
argue that a decrease in empathy towards animals and suppression
of feelings of disgust associated with dead animals are likely to
mediate such effects.
Empathy is not an exclusively inter-human phenomenon and
emerging evidence suggest that humans are evolutionary predis-
posed also for empathy towards non-human animals (Phillips,
2009; also see; Filippi et al., 2010). Possibly because it offers an
adaptive advantage to show compassion for animals that humans
depend on, this empathy is especially pronounced towards
domesticated animals (Leak & Christopher, 1982). In fact, people’s
subjective and physical empathic responses towards human and
non-human animals are of comparable strength (Westbury &
Neumann, 2008). Moreover, empathy measured as a general
construct as well as explicitly framed towards animals was nega-
tively related to meat consumption in previous research (Cerjak,
Karolyi, & Mesic, 2011; Rothgerber & Mican, 2014), and is likely
to mediate the effects of dissociation on attitudes towards meat
consumption. In other words, because dissociation essentially
removes the cognitive connection between meat and animals, it
should reduce the degree to which people feel empathy towards
animals, which, in turn, should sustain their willingness to eat
meat.
Second, we assume dissociation to bolster meat consumption
because it suppresses feelings of disgust. One function of the core
emotion disgust is to protect the individual from contamination
with pathogens and here especially within contexts that involve
“dead bodies, rotting foods, and bodily ﬂuids” (Tybur, Lieberman, &
Griskevicius, 2009, p. 105). Indeed, disgust plays a major role for
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as these bear the highest risk of contamination (Rozin & Fallon,
1980, 1987). Because interrupting the process of dissociation
essentially reminds consumers of the fact that they are eating
potentially contaminated carcasses, this should result in feelings of
disgust that, in turn, are linked to less meat eating. As a result,
disgust should mediate the effect of dissociation on willingness to
eat meat.
3. The present research
The aim of this research was to present the ﬁrst comprehensive
experimental test of the dissociation hypothesis and its underlying
processes across a range of scenarios using real-world stimuli.
Speciﬁcally, in ﬁve experiments, we aim to empirically demonstrate
1) how daily life processes of dissociation reduce empathy and
disgust, and 2) thereby increasewillingness to eat meat (see Table 1
for an overviewover the studies). Moreover, we aim to demonstrate
the potency of these processes by comparing them to alternative
processes such as reduced attribution of mind to animals
(Loughnan et al., 2010).
Throughout, we use the term ‘state dissociation’ to refer to
dissociation as response to speciﬁc experimental stimuli, while we
use ‘trait dissociation’ to refer to individual differences in partici-
pants’ general dissociation tendencies. In the ﬁrst study, we test
whether processing of meat leads to less empathy towards the
animal that was killed as a result of more state dissociation. Next,
we test whether the removal of the head from an animal roast
increases state dissociation, leading to less empathy (Study 2a) and
less empathy and disgust (Study 2b). Here, we also test whether
this reduction in empathy and disgust, in turn, increases willing-
ness to eat the meat and decreases the likelihood that participants
consider a vegetarian alternative dish. In Study 3, we test whether
presenting a living lamb in a lamb chop advertisement would
reduce state dissociation and thereby lead to more empathy and
less willingness to eat meat. In this study, we also test whether such
an effect is particularly apparent among individuals who generally
strive to dissociate animals from meat and, hence, score high on
trait dissociation.
Moving to linguistic aspects of dissociation, we in Study 4 test
whether using the euphemism “harvesting” to refer to the large-
scale killing or slaughter of animals by the meat industry would
increase state dissociation with consequent effects on empathy.
Finally, in Study 5, we test whether presenting meat ingredients in
a restaurant menu as “cow” and “pig” instead of “beef” and “pork”
would interrupt the process of state dissociation, leading to more
empathy and disgust and, consequently, to less willingness to eat a
meat dish and more willingness to consider a vegetarian alterna-
tive. Again, we here test whether this process is especially apparent
among individuals who score high on trait dissociation and, hence,
generally try to dissociate meat from animals.
To test whether the effects can be generalized and are not
speciﬁc to one animal type, a variation of animals (chicken, pig, cow
and sheep) are included as stimuli in the different studies. In terms
of our analytic procedure, in all studies we conduct between-group
comparisons using IBM SPSS version 22, while path analyses with
manifest variables were conducted in IBM AMOS version 22 to test
for mediation. Last, the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) was used to
test whether experimental effects were moderated by trait disso-
ciation in Study 3 and 5.
4. Study 1
The average consumer can choose between wide varieties of
meat products. One dimension onwhich these products differ is thedegree to which they are industrially processed. For instance,
consumers can buy a relatively unprocessed whole raw chicken
that still resembles the animal’s shape and structure to some de-
gree, or minced chickenmeat that has no resemblance to this shape
or structure at all. In this ﬁrst study, we hypothesize that the more
industrially processed meat is, the less empathy it elicits towards
the animal that was slaughtered. This effect we expect to be due to
state dissociation. That is, we predict that participants who see the
industrially processed meat show less empathy because they have
more difﬁculties imagining that the meat came from a living being.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
A total of 288 native Norwegians were recruited through
snowball sampling on social online networks for a study on the
“perception of pictures”. The majority of participants were women
(61.1%) and the average age was 30.86 years (SD ¼ 11.58). While
92.4% reported to be omnivores, 3.5% reported to be pescetarians,
2.8% to be vegetarians and 1.4% to be vegan. On a scale ranging from
0 (never) to 7 (daily), participants on average reported to eat meat
5.13 days (SD ¼ 2.03). Asked about how often they ate chicken
speciﬁcally, they reported to eat this type of meat 1.39 days per
week (M ¼ 1.04).
4.1.2. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.
In each condition, participants answered the same set of questions
related to a picture of raw chicken meat that was presented on top
of the screen. Crucially, we experimentally varied the degree to
which the meat had been industrially processed. That is, in the low
processing condition that was treated as control group, the picture
displayed awhole chicken (see Table 1 for the three pictures). In the
medium processing condition, it displayed a chicken that had been
cut into commonly consumed parts. In the high processing condi-
tion, the picture showed minced chicken meat. The pictures were
matched in color and size and were in each condition displayed on
top throughout the survey (except on the informed consent page
and the demographic section where no picture was presented).
While seeing the picture on top, participants completed the
following measures:
4.1.3. Empathy
Five questions, of which two were reversed to prevent response
bias, measured empathy for the animal that had been slaughtered
(a ¼ 0.93). These items were based on the empathy subscale of the
interpersonal reactivity index developed by Davis (1980), but were
adjusted for the purpose of the present research. Speciﬁcally, on a
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally
agree), participants rated their agreement with the statements
“When I see the picture above, I feel sorry for the animal that was
slaughtered”, “Thinking about the animal that was slaughtered to
produce themeat displayed above does not disturbme a great deal”
(reversed), “Seeing the picture makes me feel pity for the animal
that was slaughtered”, “I feel sad for the animal that died to pro-
duce the meat above” and “I do not really feel very sorry for the
animal that had to die” (reversed).
4.1.4. State dissociation
Three items measured the degree of dissociation in response to
the stimuli. Speciﬁcally, participants rated their agreement with the
statement “The ﬁrst thing I thought about when I saw the picture
above was a living being” on the same Likert scale as the empathy
measure. Next, they rated how difﬁcult or easy they found it to
imagine that what was “displayed on the picture once was part of a
Table 1
Hypotheses, main study variables and stimuli used in the different studies are displayed.
Study sesehtopyHselbairaVilumitS
1 Chicken is presented at different processing stages Empathy, State dissociation H1: Highly processed meat causes less empathy 
H2: This effect is due to higher levels of state 
dissociation  
Low Medium High 
2a/b Pork roast is presented with/without head 2a: Empathy, Perceived mental 
capacity, Willingness to eat meat, 
State dissociation 
2b: Empathy, Disgust, Willingness 
to eat meat, Willingness to consider 
vegetarian alternative, State 
dissociation 
H1: A beheaded pork roast causes more willingness to 
eat meat (2a&2b) and less willingness to consider 
a vegetarian alternative (2b) 
H2: These effects are due to lower levels of empathy 
(2a&2b), and disgust (2b), caused by higher levels of 
state dissociation 
Head Condition Beheaded Condition
3 Lamb chops advertisement is presented with/without lamb Trait dissociation, Empathy, 
Perceived mental capacity, 
Willingness to eat meat, State 
dissociation 
H1: Presenting a living lamb in an advertisement 
causes lower willingness to eat meat 
H2: This effect is due to higher levels of empathy 
caused by lower levels of state dissociation 
H3: Effects are particularly pronounced for participants 
scoring high on trait dissociation 
Control Condition Lamb Present Condition 
4 Mass slaughter of cows is presented as either Empathy, State dissociation H1: Participants are less empathic when “harvested” is 
uses as compared to “killed” and “slaughtered” 
H2: This effect is due to higher levels of state 
dissociation 
Slaughtered Killed Harvested 
5 Restaurant menu is presented with meat/animal terms Trait dissociation, Empathy, Disgust, 
Willingness to eat meat, Willingness 
to consider vegetarian alternative, 
State Dissociation 
H1: Presenting animal terms in a restaurant menu 
causes less willingness to eat meat and more 
willingness to choose a vegetarian alternative  
H2: These effects are due to higher levels of empathy 
and disgust caused by lower levels of state dissociation
Meat Terms Animal Terms 
Note. High-resolution stimuli are available from the first author. Please note that Study 2a and 2b were conducted independently using different samples.
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(very easy). Last, they completed the question “How much does the
picture above remind you of a living being?” where responses were
rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
The scale comprising these three items had acceptable reliability
(a ¼ 0.68) and scores were reversed so that higher scores meant
more state dissociation.Fig. 2. Dissociation fully mediated the effect of the experimental condition on
empathy in Study 1. The estimate in parenthesis represents the direct effect before the
mediator was added to the model. Standardized estimates are displayed. *p ¼ 0.054,
**p < 0.001.4.2. Results
In a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with empathy
and state dissociation as dependent variables, the experimental
manipulation had a multivariate effect, F(4, 570) ¼ 11.64, p < 0.001,
hp
2 ¼ 0.08. This effect did not further interact with participants’
gender (p ¼ 0.892). Planned contrasts showed that participants in
the high processing condition indeed showed more state dissoci-
ation (M ¼ 5.33, SE ¼ 0.13) than in the low processing condition
(M ¼ 4.10, SE ¼ 0.14; p < 0.001, 95% CI of difference [0.85, 1.61]). No
difference was observed between the medium processing condi-
tion (M ¼ 4.27, SE ¼ 0.13) and the low processing condition
(p ¼ 0.379). Planned contrasts showed that participants in the high
processing condition also reported less empathy towards the ani-
mal that was slaughtered (M¼ 2.91, SE¼ 0.17) than those in the low
processing condition (M ¼ 3.41, SE ¼ 0.18; p ¼ 0.045, 95% CI of
difference [0.98, 0.01]). Although an inspection of the error bars
(see Fig. 1) suggested that participants in the medium processing
condition tended to show less empathy than those in the low
processing condition, this difference was insigniﬁcant (p ¼ 0.465).
Next, we set out to test whether the lower empathy in the high
processing condition compared to the low processing condition
was due to, and hence mediated by, state dissociation. To do so, we
estimated a path model where state dissociation mediated the ef-
fect of the experimental condition (coded as: 0 ¼ low processing,
1 ¼ high processing) on empathy. Indeed, in this fully-saturated
model, state dissociation fully mediated the effect of the experi-
mental manipulation on empathy (see Fig. 2). Bootstrapping with
5000 random re-samples showed that the resulting, indirect effect
was negative and signiﬁcant (b ¼ 0.22, SE ¼ 0.05, 95% CI [0.32,
0.14], p < 0.001).4.3. Preliminary discussion
As expected, the degree to which raw chicken meat is indus-
trially processed predicted different degrees of empathy. Impor-
tantly, these effects were fully due to state dissociation, supportingFig. 1. In Study 1, participants reported less empathy towards the animal that was
slaughtered in the high processing condition than in the low processing condition.
*p < 0.05. ±1 SE are displayed.its importance as underlying process. Nevertheless, although
providing ﬁrst support for our hypothesis, the study had some
limitations. First, even the baseline picture showed a relatively
processed and beheaded hen. Previous research suggests that the
face is “the emotion highway” (De Waal, 2009, p. 83), communi-
cating inner states and offering the quickest connection to the
other. It may therefore be necessary to evoke empathy (Cole, 2001).
Hence, especially the removal of the head may potentiate the
dissociation e empathy link. Second, empathy increases with
similarity, and here species similarity is one relevant factor (Brown,
Bradley, & Lang, 2006; Krebs, 1975; Preston & de Waal, 2002). For
instance, humans generally feel more empathy towards other pri-
mates and mammals, and less empathy towards birds (Kubberød
et al., 2002; Westbury & Neumann, 2008). Hence, the observed
effects may have been stronger if we had used another animal, such
as a pig or a cow. The next study addresses these limitations.
5. Study 2a
In this study, we test whether removing the head from an
otherwise identical animal roast would produce less empathy and
more willingness to eat meat. It has been suggested that people
solve the meat paradox by downplaying the perceived mental ca-
pacity of animals they eat (Bastian, Loughnan, et al., 2012;
Loughnan et al., 2010). Such a rationalization process is likely to
be more difﬁcult when the animal head is present as it is the center
of mental capacities. Hence, while we expect the effects of
removing the head on empathy and willingness to eat meat to be
mediated by state dissociation, we also test perceived mental ca-
pacity as alternative mediator (Bastian, Loughnan, et al., 2012;
Loughnan et al., 2010).
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
We recruited 168 US Americans through Amazon MTurk. As in
all of the remaining studies, the research was described as dealing
with “social issues and food”. The average age was 32.89 years
(SD ¼ 10.16) and both genders were relatively equally distributed
(women: 43.5%). Of all participants, 89.3% reported to be omni-
vores, 6.0% reported to be pescetarians, 3.0% to be vegetarians and
1.8% to be vegan. On average, participants reported to eat meat in
general including ﬁsh 5.08 days per week (SD¼ 2.13), and pork 1.52
days per week (SD ¼ 1.36).
5.1.2. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions.
In both conditions, they were told that they were about to see a
picture of a pork roast. In the head condition, the pig’s head was
visible, whereas it was removed with a photo-editing software in
the beheaded condition. Apart from this difference, the picture was
identical (see Table 1 for the stimuli). As in the ﬁrst study, the
Fig. 4. Showing the head of the pig (Study 2a and 2b), a living lamb (Study 3) or
replacing “beef” with “cow” and “pork” with “pig” in a restaurant menu (Study 5)
made participants feel less willing to eat meat. ±1 SE are displayed.
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demographics section and the informed consent form. In addition
to the empathy (a¼ 0.98) and state dissociation measure (a¼ 0.75)
from Study 1, participants also completed a capacity for sensation
measure and indicated their hypothetical willingness to eat the
meat:
5.1.3. Capacity for sensation
A measure adopted from Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, and
Hodson (2012) was used to assess attribution of mind to the ani-
mal that had been killed. Speciﬁcally, participants rated the degree
to which they believed that the animal once had the mental ca-
pacity to experience nine sensations (i.e., pain, hunger, pleasure,
fear, happiness, consciousness, seeing, hearing, tasting; a ¼ 0.95)
and nine intellectual states (i.e., thinking, imagining, wishing,
needing, desire, intending, planning, choosing, reasoning; a¼ 0.94)
on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (deﬁnitely did not experience) to 7
(deﬁnitely did experience).
5.1.4. Willingness to eat meat
Participants answered to the following question: “Hypotheti-
cally speaking, how negative or positive do you feel about eating
the meat on the picture?” Responses were rated on a sliding-
response scale ranging from 0 (extremely negative) to 100
(extremely positive).
5.2. Results
The beheaded condition produced a substantial drop in
empathy, t(166) ¼ 4.94, p < 0.001, increased state dissociation,
t(166) ¼ 7.52, p < 0.001 (see Fig. 3) and willingness to eat the
meat, t(166) ¼ 3.83, p < 0.001 (see Fig. 4). No effect was observed
on the sensation, t(166) ¼ 1.07, p ¼ 0.258, or intellectual capacity
measures, t(166) ¼ 0.92, p ¼ 0.361. None of the effects was
moderated by gender (0.399 < ps < 0.830).
We set out to test whether 1) state dissociation would mediate
the effect on empathy and 2) whether the effect on willingness to
eat the meat would be mediated by this lowered empathy that
resulted from state dissociation. To do so, we ran a saturated path
model with experimental manipulation as predictor, state dissoci-
ation as ﬁrst stage mediator, empathy as second stage mediatorFig. 3. In Study 2a, participants showed more state dissociation and less empathy when the
pork roast also decreased feelings of disgust. ±1 SE are displayed.(predicted by state dissociation), and willingness to eat meat as
outcome variable. Indeed, once we added state dissociation to the
model, the direct effects on empathy and willingness to eat meat
became insigniﬁcant, indicating full mediation (see Fig. 5). Boot-
strapping indicated that the resulting indirect effects of the
experimental manipulation on empathy (b ¼ 0.35, SE ¼ 0.06, 95%
CI [0.48, 0.25], p < 0.001) and on willingness to eat meat were
signiﬁcant (b ¼ 0.25, SE ¼ 0.06, 95% CI [0.13, 0.38], p < 0.001).5.3. Preliminary discussion
As expected, beheading the pork roast strongly reduced
empathy, and this relation was fully due to an increase in state
dissociation. Moreover, the decrease in empathy caused by
heightened dissociation fully mediated the effect on willingness to
eat meat. In other words, participants seemed more willing to eat
the meat when the head was removed precisely because it
increased state dissociation and thereby led to less empathy. No
effect was observed on the mental capacity ratings, even though
the head is the locus of mental capacity. Hence, the results lend
support for dissociation being the dominant process here.pork roast was beheaded. In Study 2b, this pattern was replicated and beheading the
Fig. 5. State dissociation fully mediated the effect of the experimental manipulation on empathy in Study 2a and, here, both state dissociation and empathy fully mediated the effect
on willingness to eat. In Study 2b, state dissociation fully mediated the effects on empathy and partially mediated the effect on disgust. Here, the experimental effects on willingness
to eat the meat and likelihood of choosing a vegetarian alternative were mediated by state dissociation and the decrease in empathy and disgust that it caused. The following
correlations in Study 2b were not displayed for reasons of presentation: empathy and disgust: b ¼ 0.50, p < 0.001; willingness to eat meat and vegetarian choice: b ¼ 0.33,
p < 0.001. *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001. Standardized estimates are displayed.
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did not include disgust as alternative mediator. In the next study,
we therefore try to replicate our ﬁndings testing the unique role of
both mediators.6. Study 2b
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants
Power analyses conducted in GPower 3.1and based on between-
group differences with the effect size d of around 0.70 observed in
Study 2a indicated that 90 participants would be needed to have a
95% chance to observe an effect with a signiﬁcance criterion of 0.05.
This sample size also satisﬁes the recommended ratio of ﬁve to ten
participants per observed variable for structural equation model-
ling (Bentler & Chou, 1987). To ensure adequate power, we
recruited 101 participants (Mage ¼ 34.80, SDage ¼ 11.40; women:
60.4%) using the same approach as in Study 2a. In this sample, 87.0%
reported to be omnivores, 7.0% to be pescetarians and 6.0% to be
vegetarians. On average, participants reported to eatmeat 4.63 days
per week (SD ¼ 2.39) and pork speciﬁcally 1.29 days per week
(SD ¼ 1.05).6.1.2. Procedure
Following the exact procedure as in the previous study,participants were randomly assigned to the head or beheaded
condition. Seeing the respective pork roast picture, participants
completed the same measures as in the previous study (empathy:
a¼ 0.96; state dissociation: a¼ 0.81; willingness to eat meat), with
the difference that they also were asked to indicate how likely it
was that they would choose an alternative vegetarian dish on a
sliding-response scale (0 very unlikely e 100 very likely). Moreover,
they completed a measure of disgust adopted from Horberg, Oveis,
Keltner, and Cohen (2009) instead of the capacity of sensation
measure, as the latter was unaffected by the experiment in Study
2a. Here, participants rated the degree to which they felt three
emotions (i.e., “grossed out”, “disgusted” and “queasy, sick to my
stomach”; a ¼ 0.97) when they saw the picture on a 7-point scale,
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a great deal).6.2. Results
Participants showed more state dissociation, t(99) ¼ 5.04,
p < 0.001, less empathy, t(99) ¼ 3.51, p ¼ 0.001, and less disgust,
t(99) ¼ 4.32, p < 0.001, when the pork roast was beheaded than
when the head was part of the roast (see Fig. 3). Moreover, they
showed a higher willingness to eat the meat, t(99) ¼ 2.77,
p ¼ 0.007 (see Fig. 4), and were marginally signiﬁcantly less likely
to consider a vegetarian alternative―with head: M ¼ 52.00,
SE ¼ 5.56; beheaded: M ¼ 37.88, SE ¼ 5.11; t(99) ¼ 1.87, p ¼ 0.065.
Neither of these effects was further moderated by participants’
1 The survey contained one exploratory measure, tapping food associations, that
was not included in the analyses as it was irrelevant for the focus of this paper.
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Next, we estimated a path model similar to Study 2a. However,
given themore complexmodel with twomediators and the smaller
sample size, we tested a more parsimonious model, dropping the
direct effects that turned insigniﬁcant when mediators were added
to the model in the previous studies. Hence, based on our working
hypotheses and the full mediations observed in the previous two
studies, state dissociation was expected to fully mediate the
experimental effects on empathy and at least partially to mediate
the effects on disgust, given that we still had no evidence about the
strength of the latter mediation. Moreover, as empathy (predicted
by state dissociation) had fully mediated the experimental effects
on willingness to eat meat, we expected empathy and disgust
together also to fully mediate these effects. In the well-ﬁtting
model, c2(df ¼ 5, N ¼ 101) ¼ 8.34, p ¼ 0.138, RMSEA ¼ 0.082,
CFI ¼ 0.991, bootstrapping showed that the experimental manip-
ulation indirectly led to less empathy (b ¼ 0.29, SE ¼ 0.06, 95% CI
[0.43, 0.17], p ¼ 0.001) and disgust (b ¼ 0.22, SE ¼ 0.07, 95% CI
[0.36, 0.12], p < 0.001), mediated by state dissociation. When
considering a weak direct effect of the experimental manipulation
on disgust that remained signiﬁcant (b¼0.16, p¼ 0.049), the total
effects of the experimental manipulation on disgust and empathy
did not differ in strength (Db¼ 0.09, SE¼ 0.07, 95% CI [0.06, 0.23]).
Because empathy and disgust predicted less willingness to eat
meat and a higher likelihood to choose the vegetarian alternative,
the experimental manipulation had an indirect positive effect on
willingness to eat the meat (b ¼ 0.31, SE ¼ 0.07, 95% CI [0.18, 0.45],
p < 0.001) and an indirect negative effect on likelihood to choose
vegetarian (b ¼ 0.29, SE ¼ 0.06, 95% CI [0.41, 0.18], p < 0.001).
The indirect effects that involved mediation by empathy did not
differ in strength from those that involved mediation by disgust
(willingness to eat meat as dependent variable: Db ¼ 0.10,
SE ¼ 0.07, 95% CI [0.26, 0.03]; likelihood to choose vegetarian as
dependent variable: Db ¼ 0.09, SE ¼ 0.07, 95% CI [0.03, 0.25]).
6.3. Preliminary discussion
We successfully replicated the ﬁndings from Study 2a, while
also obtaining ﬁrst evidence of disgust functioning as additional
mediator. As expected, both disgust and empathy to equal degrees
mediated the effects of state dissociation onwillingness to eat meat
and on likelihood to choose a vegetarian alternative dish. Thus, the
removal of the head seems crucial in making consumers disconnect
meat from its animal origin, with downstream effects on disgust,
empathy and, consequently, meat eating.
7. Study 3
It is not unusual that animals are presented alongside the
advertisement for agricultural products that do not involve the
killing of an animal (e.g., cows in a milk advertisement). However,
when the killing of an animal is involved as in the production of
meat, this is seldom the case (Grauerholz, 2007; Heinz& Lee, 1998).
In this study, we hypothesize and test whether portraying a living
animal in a meat advertisement increases empathy because it in-
terrupts the underlying dissociation process and, as a consequence
of this effect, decreases willingness to eat the respective meat.
Having established a general pattern of results in the two ﬁrst
studies, we also test whether these effects interact with individual
differences in dissociation. In fact, the degree to which people
mentally separate meat from its animal origin seems to result not
only from features of the meat product, as indicated by Studies 1
and 2, but also from individual differences in dissociation
(Rothgerber, 2013). Reports indicate that a considerable percentage
of meat consumers do not like to think about the fact that the meatthey consume comes from once-living animals (Mayﬁeld, Bennett,
Tranter, & Wooldridge, 2007), and avoid to associate meat with
animals in order to draw attention away from the act of eating
animals. Using a trait measure of this tendency, we test whether
variations in trait dissociation moderate the experimental effects.
High dissociation tendency is linked to lower meat consumption
(Rothgerber, 2013), such that people who generally tend to spend
efforts dissociating animals from meat consume less meat. If the
presence of a living animal in the advertisement renders dissocia-
tion more difﬁcult, we hypothesize this effect to be especially
pronounced among individuals with high trait dissociation, as they
already struggle with dissociating meat from animals. Such a
moderated effect would give even stronger support of the role of
dissociation for meat consumption.
Last, because it has been argued that denying animals morally
relevant qualities may be a potent way to resolve the meat paradox
especially in scenarios where animals are presented in meat ad-
vertisements (Bastian, 2011), we again include such as measure as
alternative mediator despite the fact that no such effects were
observed in Study 2a.
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Participants
Following the same procedure as in the previous study, 187 US
Americans were recruited through Amazon MTurk (Mage ¼ 37.32,
SDage ¼ 13.49; 56.7% women). While 90.4% reported to be omni-
vores, 3.2% were pescetarians, 4.8% vegetarians and 1.6% vegans. On
average, participants reported to eat meat 4.75 days per week
(SD ¼ 2.16) and lamb speciﬁcally 0.28 days per week (SD ¼ 0.77).
7.1.2. Procedure
Participants ﬁrst completed a moderator measure assessing
their general disassociation tendencies (see description of this
measure below). Next, they ﬁnished three ﬁller tasks and were told
that they would be asked questions about an advertisement, before
being randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In both condi-
tions, a lamb chops advertisement was presented on top of the
survey. However, in the control condition, only the lamb chops were
presented on the picture, whereas a picture of a living lamb was
added to the advertisement in the lamb condition (see Table 1 for
the stimuli). The size and design of the advertisement were care-
fully matched between conditions. Participants were asked to
complete the following measures1 (note that the “advertisement”
picture was only displayed for mediators and dependent variables
and not for the trait dissociation moderator):
7.1.3. Trait dissociation
We used a scale from Rothgerber (2013) to measure general
tendencies to dissociate animals from meat (a ¼ 0.88). Speciﬁcally,
participants completed three items such as “When I look at meat, I
try hard not to connect it with an animal” or “When I eat meat, I try
not to think about the life of the animal I am eating” where re-
sponses were rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally
disagree) to 7 (totally agree).
7.1.4. Empathy
The ﬁve items used to measure empathy in the previous studies
were adapted to the present context (i.e., “Seeing the lamb chops
makes me feel pity for the animal that was slaughtered”; a ¼ 0.96).
Fig. 6. In Study 3, participants showed less state dissociation and more empathy when
a lamb was displayed in the lamb chops advertisement. ±1 SE are displayed.
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As in Study 2a, the measure of Bastian, Costello, et al. (2012) was
used to assess attribution of mind (sensation subscale: a ¼ 0.92;
intellect subscale: a ¼ 0.92).
7.1.6. Willingness to eat
As in the previous study, participants indicated how positive or
negative they felt about eating the meat presented.
7.1.7. State dissociation
The three items used in the previous study were adapted to the
present context to measure dissociation as reaction to the adver-
tisement (e.g., “The ﬁrst thing I thought about when I saw the meat
displayed above was a living being”; a ¼ 0.75). The items were
reversed scored so that higher scores meant more state
dissociation.
7.2. Results
Correlations between the main variables are presented in
Table 2. As expected, participants showed more empathy,
t(185) ¼ 3.51, p ¼ 0.001, and less state dissociation, t(185) ¼ 6.67,
p < 0.001, when the lamb was presented in the advertisement (see
Fig. 6). Moreover, they were less willing to eat meat when the lamb
was presented than when it was not presented, t(185) ¼ 3.33,
p ¼ 0.001 (see Fig. 4). No effects were observed on attribution of
mind (sensation: p¼ 0.978; intellect: p¼ 0.788), which disqualiﬁed
the measure as mediator in the path model presented later on.
While gender did not moderate the experimental effects
(0.121 < p < 0.441), women showed more trait dissociation
(M ¼ 4.79, SD ¼ 1.72) but less state dissociation (M ¼ 3.52,
SD ¼ 1.64) than men did ― trait dissociation: M ¼ 4.10, SD ¼ 1.67,
t(185) ¼ 2.74, p ¼ 0.007; state dissociation: M ¼ 4.15, SD ¼ 1.44,
t(185) ¼ 2.73, p ¼ 0.007.
We set out to replicate the mediation model from Study 2a.
Again, state dissociation fully mediated the effect of the experi-
mental manipulation on empathy, and together with empathy
mediated the experimental effect on willingness to eat meat (see
Fig. 7). Bootstrapping indicated that both the indirect effects on
empathy (b ¼ 0.32, SE ¼ 0.05, 95% CI [0.23, 0.42], p < 0.001) and on
meat eating were signiﬁcant (b ¼ 0.25, SE ¼ 0.06, 95% CI [0.36,
0.12], p < 0.001). A small and positive direct effect of state
dissociation on willingness to eat meat remained signiﬁcant (see
Fig. 7).
Last, we ran moderated regression models to test whether the
experimental effects on state dissociation, empathy and meat
eating would be especially pronounced among participants who
scored high on trait dissociation. The interactions between theTable 2
Means, standard deviations and correlations between main study variables in
study 3.
Variable M SD 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1 Trait
dissociation
4.49 1.73 0.36 *** 0.05 0.07 0.17 * 0.24 **
2 Empathy 4.11 1.89 0.25 ** 0.30 *** 0.69 *** 0.84 ***
3 Capacity
sensation
5.75 1.34 0.54 *** 0.21 ** 0.16 *
4 Capacity
intellect
4.00 1.52 0.22 ** 0.23 **
5 State
dissociation
3.79 1.58 0.65 ***
6 Willingness
to eat meat
52.36 35.39
Note. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.experimental manipulation and trait dissociation were signiﬁcant
for all variables―empathy: b ¼ 0.15, p ¼ 0.026; F(3, 183) ¼ 15.50,
p < 0.001; state dissociation: b¼0.18, p¼ 0.006; F(3, 183)¼ 19.87,
p < 0.001; willingness to eat meat: b ¼ 0.14, p ¼ 0.053; F(3,
183) ¼ 8.90, p < 0.001. Simple slopes showed that when the lamb
was presented, empathy increased only among participants who
scored medium and, especially, among those who scored high on
trait dissociation (see Fig. 8). Similarly, especially among those who
scored high on trait dissociation did the experimental manipulation
produce a substantial drop in state dissociation. Last, willingness to
eat meat dropped only among those who had medium or high
levels of trait dissociation.7.3. Preliminary discussion
The results demonstrated how portrayals of animals in meat
advertisements increase empathy as a consequence of reduced
dissociation. When a living lamb was presented alongside lamb
chops in an advertisement, participants showed more empathy
towards the animal that had to die to produce the chops, and this
relation was fully due to a decrease in dissociation. Moreover,
participants were less willing to eat the lamb chops when the an-
imal was presented, and this was precisely due to this increase in
empathy.
Although empathy substantially mediated the effects as second-
order mediator, aweak positive effect of dissociation onwillingness
to eat meat remained signiﬁcant. Hence, alternative mediators may
be at play. Lorenz (1970) argued that animals, which have facial and
body features that make them look “cute” and resemble human
babies, release a mechanism in humans to protect and nurture
them. Admittedly, the lamb in our advertisementmay look cute and
innocent to participants. Hence, while disgust is an unlikely alter-
native mediator here, some type of “cuteness” reaction may have
also mediated the effects.
After the ﬁrst three studies demonstrated how meat processing
and presentation affect empathy and disgust as a process of
dissociation, we aim to demonstrate similar processes at the lin-
guistic level in the next two studies.
Fig. 7. State dissociation fully mediated the effect of the experimental manipulation on empathy in Study 3, and both state dissociation and empathy mediated the effect on
willingness to eat meat. Paths that became insigniﬁcant when state dissociation was added to the model are displayed in grey. *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001. Standardized estimates are
displayed.
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Every day, hundreds of thousands animals are slaughtered to
produce meat products. However, the ways in which this process is
referred to varies. For instance, while animal rights activists may
describe it as “killing”, the food industry may refer to it as “har-
vesting” (Stibbe, 2001), a term that according to the Oxford dic-
tionary in fact can describe “a quantity of animals caught or killed
for human use”.
The way we talk about certain phenomena (i.e., how they are
framed) inﬂuences our evaluations and choices (Keren, 2011; Lakoff,
2004). People pay more for a burger described as 75% lean than one
described as 25% fat (Levin & Gaeth, 1988), and are more willing toFig. 8. In Study 3, participants who generally tended to dissociate animals from the meat the
the lamb meat when a living lamb was presented in the meat advertisement.choose the more expensive airline ticket including a carbon fee
when the fee is framed positively (as an offset) compared towhen it
is framed negatively (as a tax; Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010).
Along these lines, we set out to test whether framing the food
industry’s large-scale killing of animals using the euphemism
“harvesting” as compared to “killing” or “slaughtering” would in-
crease dissociation, leading to less empathy.
8.1. Method
8.1.1. Participants
A total of 292 US Americans were recruited through Amazon
MTurk (Mage¼ 35.54, SDage¼ 12.38; women: 52.5%). Of these, 88.0%y eat became especially empathic, showed less dissociation and were less willing to eat
Fig. 9. In Study 4, participants showed more dissociation when the term ‘harvested’
was used than when ‘killed’ and ‘slaughtered’ were used. ***p < 0.001. ±1 SE are
displayed.
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be vegetarians and 1.7% to be vegan. On average, participants re-
ported to eat meat 4.75 times per week (SD ¼ 2.17).
8.1.2. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.
In each condition, participants read the same text with the differ-
ence that the verb was varied between conditions:
“30.2 million cows were [experimental condition: harvested/
slaughtered/killed] for food production in the US last year, ac-
cording to USDA statistics.”
Hence, for one third of the participants, the verb in the sentence
constituted either harvested, slaughtered or killed. The text was
presented on top throughout the survey, except on the de-
mographics section and the informed consent. Participants
completed the following measures:
8.1.3. Empathy
Respondents rated their empathy towards the cows on the
measure from the previous studies adapted to the present context
(a ¼ 0.96). Importantly, the verb in each of these items was
matched to the respective condition (i.e., harvest condition: “I feel
sorry for the animals that were harvested”, slaughter condition: “I
feel sorry for the animals that were slaughtered”, kill condition: “I
feel sorry for the animals that were killed”).
8.1.4. State dissociation
We asked participants to rate the degree to which the word in
the respective condition reminded them of the fact that the dead
animals once had been living beings: “How much does the word
‘[harvested/slaughtered/killed]’ remind you of the fact that animals
lost their lives?” and “How much does the word ‘[harvested/
slaughtered/killed]’ remind you of the fact that the animals were
living beings?” both rated from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).
Hence, given that the manipulation in this study was linguistic and
dealt with a large amount of animals rather than a speciﬁc piece of
meat as in the previous studies, state dissociation here reﬂects the
mental separation between the killed animals and the living ani-
mals. These highly correlated items (r ¼ 0.87, p < 0.001) were
reversed before a mean dissociation score was created.
8.2. Results
As expected, participants differed in the degree to which the
words reminded them of the fact that the animals had been living
beings, F(2, 290) ¼ 17.39, p < 0.001, hp2 ¼ 0.11. LSD post-hoc tests
showed that those in the harvested condition showed more state
dissociation than those in the kill and slaughter conditions (see
Fig. 9). Gender did not moderate the effects (0.105 < ps < 0.138). As
the killed and slaughtered conditions did not differ from each other
(p ¼ 0.769), both were merged and compared to the harvest con-
dition in consecutive analyses similar to analytic procedures in
previous research (Kimel, Huesmann, Kunst, & Halperin, 2016;
Kunst, Thomsen, Sam, & Berry, 2015).
Although no direct effect of the experimental manipulation on
the empathy ratings was observed, F(2, 290) ¼ 0.16, p ¼ 0.853,
mediation analyses showed that it had an indirect effect on
empathy that was mediated by state dissociation. Speciﬁcally, path
analysis showed that the experimental dummy variable (coded as:
0 ¼ merged ‘killed’ and ‘slaughtered’ condition, 1 ¼ ‘harvested’
condition) led to more state dissociation, which, in turn, was
related to less empathy (b ¼ 0.53, p < 0.001). Finally, boot-
strapping showed that the resulting indirect effect was signiﬁcant,
b ¼ 0.18, SE ¼ 0.03, 95% CI [0.25, 0.12], p < 0.001.8.3. Preliminary discussion
As expected, the term “harvested” increased dissociation as
compared to “killed” and “slaughtered”. While no direct effects on
empathy were observed, this difference in dissociation indirectly
led to less empathy towards the animals that were described in the
text. While euphemisms such as “harvesting” may affect one’s
stance towards meat, people are less commonly exposed to them in
public discourse or consumer choice situations, when food de-
cisions are actually made. In the next study, we therefore tested
whether the terms “beef” and “pork” that are commonly used to
refer to cow and pig meat in consumer situations would serve the
function of dissociation, and consequently increase willingness to
eat meat, as has been suggested (Adams, 2004; Singer, 1995).9. Study 5
The previous study showed that euphemisms describing the
killing of animals by the meat industry elicited processes of
dissociation with downstream effects on empathy. This last study
tests whether terms commonly used to describe the meat end-
product have similar effects. It has been suggested that referring
to meat with terms such as beef and pork “disguises the fact that
the body parts we purchase and consume are the objectiﬁed re-
mains of former subjects” (Glenn, 2004, p. 69). Consequently, these
terms should bolster the process of dissociation and thereby lead to
less empathy and disgust, and to more willingness to eat the meat.
To test this, we present participants with one of two matched
restaurant foodmenus. In one condition, the dishes in themenu are
described with the terms “beef” and “pork”, that is, the terms that
are commonly used in restaurants. In the other condition, whichwe
expect to interrupt the dissociation process, these terms are
replaced by “cow” and “pig”.
As in Study 3, we include a measure of individual tendencies to
dissociate animals frommeat and expect a particularly pronounced
effect for participants with high trait dissociation. We predict this
interaction effect in the scenario of the present study because the
words “cow” and “pig” are usually used in contexts describing
living animals, not in contexts describing potential food to be
consumed. Such animal terms should therefore complicate disso-
ciation especially for people who usually have to exert themselves
to not think about the animal origins of meat to be able to consume
it, and hence should reduce willingness to eat the meat particularly
within this group.
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9.1.1. Participants
A total of 190 participants were recruited through Amazon
MTurk (Mage ¼ 33.59, SDage ¼ 10.18; 52.1% women). Of these, 93.7%
reported to be omnivores, 3.7% to be pescetarians, 2.7% to be veg-
etarians and 0.5% to be vegans. On average, participants reported to
eat pork 1.64 days per week (SD ¼ 1.42) and beef 2.60 days per
week (SD ¼ 1.64).Fig. 10. Replacing “beef” with “cow” and “pork” with “pig” in a restaurant menu
decreased state dissociation, and increased empathy and disgust in Study 5. ±1 SE are
displayed.9.1.2. Procedure
Participants ﬁrst completed the trait dissociation measure (i.e.,
the moderator; a ¼ 0.93) and the ﬁller tasks from Study 3. Next,
they were told that they were about to see a food menu and were
asked to read it as if they were customers in a restaurant. Here,
participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: In
the beef/pork condition, the menu that was presented to partici-
pants used the common words “beef” and “pork” to describe the
meat dishes. In the cow/pig condition, these were replaced by the
respective animal terms. The menus were matched in content,
design and size (see Table 1) and presented on top while partici-
pants completed the following measures:9.1.3. Empathy
Themeasure from the previous studies was adapted and used to
measure the empathy that reading the menu evoked (e.g., “When I
see the menu, I feel sorry for the animals that were slaughtered”;
a ¼ 0.96).9.1.4. Disgust
The measure from Study 2b was used to assess the degree to
which the menu elicited feelings of disgust (a ¼ 0.98).9.1.5. Willingness to eat meat
Using the same measure as in Study 2 and 3, we asked partici-
pants how positive they felt about eating themeat dishes presented
in the menu.9.1.6. Preference for vegetarian alternative
As in Study 2b, we also asked participants how likely it would be
that they would chose a vegetarian alternative from the menu,
given that it was offered.9.1.7. State dissociation
The state dissociation measure from the ﬁrst three studies was
adapted to the present context to assess participants’ degree of
dissociation as reaction to the menu (a ¼ 0.74).Table 3
Means, standard deviations and correlations between main study variables in
study 5.
Variable M SD 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1 Trait
dissociation
4.61 1.79 0.47 *** 0.38 *** 0.18 * 0.36 *** 0.35 ***
2 Empathy 3.43 1.83 0.74 *** 0.53 *** 0.70 *** 0.66 ***
3 Disgust 1.44 1.83 0.54 *** 0.75 *** 0.67 ***
4 State
dissociation
4.05 1.54 0.43 *** 0.40 ***
5 Willingness
to eat meat
59.97 32.09 0.68 ***
6 Vegetarian
choice
38.49 35.39
Note. *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.9.2. Results
Correlations between the main variables are presented in
Table 3. State dissociation decreased, t(188)¼ 5.49, p < 0.001, while
empathy, t(188) ¼ 2.80, p ¼ 0.005, and disgust, t(188) ¼ 3.59,
p < 0.001, increased when “beef/pork” were replaced with “cow/
pig” in the restaurant menu (see Fig. 10). Also, willingness to eat the
dishes displayed in the menu dropped once the animal words were
used, t(188) ¼ 3.59, p < 0.001, see Fig. 4. Last, participants were
marginally signiﬁcantly more likely to consider a vegetarian alter-
native when the animal labels were used (M ¼ 43.12, SE ¼ 3.84)
than when “beef” and “pork” were used (M ¼ 33.78, SE ¼ 3.49),
t(188) ¼ 1.80, p ¼ 0.074. None of the experimental effects were
moderated by participants’ gender (0.140 < ps< 0.801). However, as
in Study 3, women (M ¼ 5.13, SD ¼ 1.62) showed more trait
dissociation than men did (M ¼ 4.01, SD ¼ 1.79), t(187) ¼ 4.52,
p < 0.001, but this time no gender difference was observed for state
dissociation (p ¼ 0.798).
Having established these effects, we set out to replicate the path
model from Study 2b with this study’s experimental manipulation
(0 ¼ “beef/pork”, 1 ¼ “cow/pig”) as predictor. In contrast to Study
2b, where we expected the presentation of the animal’s head to
lead to more state dissociation, we expected the present experi-
mental manipulation to interrupt, and hence reduce, the process of
dissociation. The model achieved very close ﬁt to the data c2(df¼ 5,
N¼ 190) ¼ 4.62, p¼ 0.463, RMSEA < 0.001, CFI¼ 1.00. As expected,
the experimental manipulation led to less state dissociation, which,
in turn, led to less empathy and less disgust (see Fig. 11). Boot-
strapping showed that the indirect and positive effects of the
experimental manipulation on empathy (b¼ 0.20, SE¼ 0.04, 95% CI
[0.12, 0.29], p < 0.001) and disgust (b ¼ 0.19, SE ¼ 0.04, 95% CI [0.12,
0.29], p < 0.001) were signiﬁcant and did not differ in strength
(Db ¼ 0.00, SE ¼ 0.02, 95% CI [0.03, 0.04]). No direct effect was
observed of the experimental manipulation on disgust.
As empathy and disgust both predicted less willingness to eat
the meat dishes in the menu and a higher likelihood to choose a
vegetarian alternative, the experimental manipulation had an in-
direct and inverse effect on willingness to eat the meat dishes
(b ¼ 0.19, SE ¼ 0.04, 95% CI [0.28, 0.12], p < 0.001) and an
indirect positive effect on likelihood to eat vegetarian (b ¼ 0.17,
SE¼ 0.04, 95% CI [0.11, 0.25], p < 0.001). The strength of the indirect
Fig. 11. State dissociation mediated the effects of the experimental manipulation on empathy and disgust in Study 5. State dissociation, and the decrease in empathy and disgust
that it caused, mediated the experimental effect on willingness to eat a meat dish and to choose a vegetarian alternative. Insigniﬁcant paths are displayed in grey. The following
correlations were not displayed due to reasons of presentations: empathy and disgust, b ¼ 0.63, p < 0.001; willingness to eat meat and vegetarian choice, b ¼ 0.29, p < 0.001.
***p < 0.001. Standardized estimates are displayed.
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did not differ signiﬁcantly from those mediated by disgust (will-
ingness to eat meat dish as dependent variable: Db ¼ 0.03,
SE ¼ 0.03, 95% CI [0.03, 0.11]; likelihood to choose vegetarian as
dependent variable: Db ¼ 0.01, SE ¼ 0.03, 95% CI [0.07, 0.06]).
Last, we tested whether the experimental effects would be
moderated by trait dissociation as in Study 3. Here, the interaction
terms between the experimental manipulation and trait dissocia-
tion were signiﬁcant for disgust (b ¼ 0.14, p ¼ 0.035; F(3,
186) ¼ 15.58, p < 0.001) and marginally signiﬁcant for state
dissociation (b ¼ 0.11, p ¼ 0.089; F(3, 186) ¼ 12.29, p < 0.001), but
insigniﬁcant for empathy (b ¼ 0.10, p ¼ 0.117; F(3, 186) ¼ 21.96,
p < 0.001), willingness to eat a meat dish (b¼0.09, p¼ 0.160; F(3,
186) ¼ 13.12, p < 0.001) and likelihood of choosing a vegetarian
alternative (b ¼ 0.09, p ¼ 0.166; F(3, 186) ¼ 9.72, p < 0.001).
Nevertheless, simple slopes analyses showed a similar pattern as in
Study 3. The experimental manipulation increased empathy and
disgust and decreased willingness to eat meat only among those
with moderate and high trait dissociation, and had particularly
pronounced positive effects on state dissociation within this group
(see Fig. 12).
10. General discussion
Rachels (2004) argues that even most meat eaters will agree
with the dominant argument for vegetarianism; that 1) it is wrong
to cause unnecessary pain and suffering; 2) eating meat causes
unnecessary pain and suffering; 3) so eating meat is wrong. Hence,
meat eaters have to reconcile their diet with the fact that they
dislike causing pain to animals. However, the sterile supermarket
presentation of meat makes the second argument extremely easy
to ignore, and the conclusion is therefore never forced upon meat
consumers (Hopkins & Dacey, 2008). In six experimental studies,
we empirically demonstrated that meat practices in the modern
world indeed facilitate divorcing meat products from their animal
origins, thereby reducing empathy and disgust, which ultimately
bolsters meat consumption.
The ﬁrst study showed that the more processed meat is, the
easier it is to dissociate it from an animal being, and that this
produces a drop in empathy for the animal that was killed. Most
people buy highly processed meat in the supermarket on a daily
basis, and are vastly uninvolved in all the major processing steps
that gradually remove the animal resemblance from the carcass
(Lerner & Kalof, 1999). As the results of the ﬁrst study suggest,buying meat at this late stage of processing may make it particu-
larly easy to mentally disengage it from its animal origin.
Because the baseline picture in this ﬁrst study already was
relatively processed (e.g., the hen’s head had been removed), it was
important to follow up on these effects using a relatively unpro-
cessed animal as baseline. Moreover, we were interested in seeing
whether the processes observed in the ﬁrst study would extend to
eating intentions. In the second study, we therefore showed that
simply removing the head from a pork roast produced a substantial
decrease in empathy, which again was fully explained by an in-
crease in dissociation. Importantly, results showed that removal of
the animal’s head made participants also feel morewilling to eat its
meat and again this was due to an increase in dissociation and the
drop in empathy it had caused. Attribution of mind was unaffected
by the experimental manipulation although it was the head that
was removed and, hence, seemed to play little of a role here.
Following up on these results, we replicated our ﬁndings in a
next study, this time showing that the positive effects that
beheading of a pork roast had on willingness to eat the meat (and
the negative effects it had on choosing a vegetarian alternative
dish) were equally mediated by a decrease in empathy and feelings
of disgust. For most of the meat that is available in Western su-
permarkets, the head has been removed and is not visible to the
consumer. Based on the results, one may speculate that this is done
not only because head parts are less common in Western cuisine,
but also because presenting it may elicit both disgust and empathy,
which may substantially reduce meat buying and consumption.
However, it should be noted that the presence of a head may have
been a particularly strong cue in the Western context of our study
because Western consumers are no longer familiar with seeing the
head of the animal they will eat. Hence, future studies may test
whether our ﬁndings can be replicated in cultures where unpro-
cessed carcasses are a common sight.
Study 3 demonstrated that seeing a living animal in a food
advertisement disrupts dissociation. When we displayed a living
animal in a meat advertisement, this greatly reduced dissociation,
increasing empathy and decreasing willingness to eat the meat.
Thus, meat advertisements that contain visual cues of animals may
from a business perspective be less effective because they interrupt
the dissociation process that otherwise upholdsmeat consumption.
However, not all participants were equally affected by seeing the
living animal in the ad. Although the dissociation process was
somewhat interrupted among all participants, this was particularly
the case for thosewho generally spend efforts dissociating themeat
Fig. 12. In Study 5, presenting animal terms in a restaurant menu increased empathy and disgust, and decreased willingness to eat the meat dishes only among participants who
generally dissociate animals from the meat they eat, scoring high or moderate on trait dissociation. Among this group, the experimental effect on state dissociation was also most
pronounced.
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did seeing the living animal produce an increase in empathy and
more negativity towards eating the meat. Thus, although our re-
sults suggest that presenting animals in meat advertisement may
change the consumer attitudes and behavior of many people, it may
have no effect among those for whom dissociation generally plays
little of a role. In regard of the framework adopted in this third
study, it is also important to note that animal well-fare concerns
have started to play a considerable role for people’s meat con-
sumption (Harper & Henson, 2001), and cues indicating animal
friendly production may inﬂuence consumer behavior (Harper &
Makatouni, 2002; Toma, Stott, Revoredo-Giha, & Kupiec-Teahan,
2012). For instance, displaying an animal grazing in a farming
landscape may have the opposite effects than simply showing the
animal as in our study because it may signal animal welfare and
thereby relieve consumers’ bad consciousness to some degree.
We also tested how minor linguistic manifestations may bolster
processes of dissociation. In the fourth study, framing the annual
mass slaughter of 30.2 million cows by the U.S. food industry
through the euphemism “harvesting” (as opposed to “killing” or
“slaughtering”) produced an increase in dissociation. Although the
framing effects seemed to be tooweak to directly affect empathy for
the animals that had died, they did so indirectly, mediated by
dissociation. When we, however, replaced the words “beef” and
“pork” that people are frequently exposed to with “cow” and “pig”
in a restaurant menu, this substantially reduced willingness to eat
meat, and participants even tended to be more likely to consider a
vegetarian alternative. In this last study, disgust again emerged asequally powerful mediator as empathy. That is, reading “cow” and
“pig” in the menu evoked more empathy for the slaughtered ani-
mals but also more disgust, which both reduced willingness to eat
the dishes while increasing the likelihood of choosing a vegetarian
alternative. Disgust is central in determining people’s attitudes
towards eating animal products (Rozin& Fallon, 1980, 1987), and as
our study suggests, dissociation may maintain meat consumption
as it suppresses empathy and disgust equally. As in Study 3, the
experimental effects were moderated by the degree to which par-
ticipants generally used the strategy of dissociation in their daily
lives. Although some of the interactions fell below signiﬁcance,
simple slopes showed that effects were especially pronounced for
those who generally are prone to dissociation. Interestingly, the
experimental manipulation elicited feelings of disgust particularly
among those with high trait dissociation. Hence, as one limitation
of the present research involves that we only included disgust in
contexts where we found it to be especially relevant, this ﬁnding
further underlines the importance of future research to consider
disgust as additional mediator.
10.1. Dissociation or denial of mind? Two pathways to meat
consumption
Although earlier work has suggested that denial of mind is a
major strategy to solve the meat paradox and has suggested that it
particularly comes onlinewhen people are reminded of the animal-
meat link (Bastian, Loughnan, et al., 2012), the present studies ﬁnd
dissociation to beamorepowerful strategy in such scenarios. Inboth
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measure remained unaffected by the experimental manipulations.
Speciﬁcally, participants did not rate the animal’s mental capacities
differentlywhen the headwas removed froma pork roast (Study 2a)
or when the picture of an animal was shown in a restaurant menu
(Study 3). However, the experimental manipulations led to large
differences in state dissociation, which by affecting empathy and
disgust, in turn, explained participants’ willingness to eat meat.
According to Bastian, Costello, et al. (2012) and Bastian,
Loughnan, et al. (2012), the meat paradox arises when people eat
meat although they dislike causing harm to animals, such that their
behavior conﬂicts with their concern for animal welfare. They
further state that “meat eaters go to great lengths to overcome
these inconsistencies between their beliefs and behaviors” (Bastian,
Loughnan, et al., 2012, p. 247). However, we argue that thanks to
modern meat industry and the concealing of animal reminders in
most meat products, consumers will often not need to go to such
great lengths. Thus, by neglecting the link between meat and ani-
mals overall, the inconsistency between eating animals while not
wanting to hurt them becomes less evident, and individuals will
not experience bothersome dissonance, often rendering denial of
mind unnecessary. This notion is further supported by the results of
our moderation analyses. In the control conditions, even people
who scored high on trait dissociation (generally spending consid-
erable efforts dissociatingmeat from its animal origins in their daily
lives) differed little in state dissociation from those scoring lower
on trait dissociation. Crucially, in these control conditions, meat
was presented in the way that is typical in many western cultures.
This again suggests that the way meat and meat products are
presented to customers substantially facilitates the dissociation
process, making alternative strategies virtually unnecessary even
for those who may struggle with the meat paradox the most.
This is not to say that denial of mind plays no role for meat
consumption. Possibly, dissociation and denial of mind work in
concert with each other and are used in different contexts. We
propose that dissociation and its subsequent suppression of
empathy and disgust represents a more immediate and affective
pathway sustaining meat consumption. This pathway may be
dominant especially in consumer choice situations and when
confronted directly with meat stimuli. Denial of mind, on the other
hand may represent more of a cognitive-evaluative pathway.
Downgrading of mental capacities of the animal may primarily
come into play when active legitimization of one’s own behavior
becomes necessary, such as after people havemade the choice to, or
have already, consumed meat (Bastian, Loughnan, et al., 2012;
Loughnan et al., 2010). Given that people are most likely to deny
themind of humans and animals when they feel responsible for the
harm caused to them (Bandura, 1999; Bastian, Loughnan, et al.,
2012; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006), one may also expect denial
of mind to be a strategy that is used when people are explicitly told
that animals they eat or ate were treated badly, or to be a strategy
that is used by people actively involved in the killing of animals.
10.2. Strengths, limitations and future research
Before concluding, some strength and limitations of the present
studies should be noted. The fact that the same pattern of results
was observed across different animal types and different contexts
suggests that it represents a general process that is not limited to a
speciﬁc type of animal or context. However, it should be noted that
effects on empathy were weakest in Study 1, where the experi-
mental condition was a chicken at different stages of processing.
This comparably weak effect could be due to the fact that this was
the only study that used a bird rather than a mammal as stimulus.
Because humans feel higher empathy for mammals than birds(Kubberød et al., 2002;Westbury&Neumann, 2008), future studies
could directly test how animal type (i.e., mammals versus non-
mammals) moderates the roles of dissociation, empathy and
disgust.
Trait dissociation was tested as a moderator only in Study 3 and
5. Ideally, this moderator could have been measured also in the two
ﬁrst studies, but in these preliminary studies the aim was to
establish the general effects before exploring the complexity of
these effects by testing for moderation later on. Moreover, we
considered individual tendencies to dissociate meat from animals
as relevant only in studies that actually involved presentation of
meat products. Trait dissociation was therefore not included in
Study 4, because the experimental manipulation here was a lin-
guistic frame of the slaughtering process, not different pre-
sentations of meat products.
To avoid deception, participants did not receive any cover story
prior to participation. However, they were not informed about the
speciﬁc aims of the study or its experimental nature so that de-
mand characteristics should have been minimal. Still, demand
characteristics may have affected responses to some extent in Study
3, inwhich a picture of a lambwas displayed in only one of the food
menus, but are less likely in the remaining studies because animal
stimuli were present in all conditions. Related to this, in all studies
we used explicit self-report measures. Future studies may proﬁt-
ably address whether our paradigm can be replicated with implicit
or indirect types of measures, which also may reduce potential
demand characteristics. For instance, implicit association tests may
be used to measure spontaneous dissociation tendencies based on
reaction times. Moreover, skin conductance and facial expressions
may be used as physiological measure of affective reactions such as
disgust and empathy.
Results were obtained using real-world stimuli, such as food
menus and descriptions, with high resemblance to what people
regularly are confronted with in their daily lives. We therefore
argue that our studies have high ecological validity. Nevertheless,
because manipulations simulated consumer choice situation, we
only measured behavioral intentions rather than real behavior.
K€oster (2009) emphasizes the need for food choice research to
increase ecological validity by taking into account the dynamic and
complex interactions between food products, individual consumers
and choice environment. Future studies should therefore test the
effects of dissociation using ﬁeld experiments (i.e., in real food
choice situations such as restaurants or food-stores), and include
individual, contextual or product-related factors that may inﬂuence
the effects.
Last, regular contact with farm animals can lead to more relaxed
attitudes to animal production and less disgust reactions in relation
to meat and meat-eating (Kubberød et al., 2002). Future studies
could investigate the degree to which personal differences such as
exposure to farm animals interact with trait and state dissociation.11. Conclusion
Using a variation of scenarios with real-world stimuli and
simulated consumer-choice situations, this line of research exper-
imentally demonstrated what many philosophers and animal
rights advocates have claimed for long times (e.g., Adams, 2004;
Dunayer, 2001; Singer, 1995; Stibbe, 2001): Culturally entrenched
processes of dissociation found in the waywe produce, prepare and
talk about meat and animals sustain people’s willingness to eat
meat as they make it easy to ignore the meateanimal link. Such
dissociation reduces empathy and disgust that would otherwise
reduce meat consumption.
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